This paper applies counterfactual simulation experiments based on a calibrated DSGE model of a small open-economy. We compare the alternative monetary regimes of East Asia: the monetary targeting framework of the Central Bank of the Republic of China, the …xed-rate system practiced in Hong Kong, the Taylor rule used in Korea, and the exchange-rate management policy used in Singapore. The welfare di¤erences are minimal, but the monetary rule of Taiwan delivers signi…cantly lower share market volatility for a variety of shocks.
Introduction
In the past decade, in ‡ation targeting rule has received wide attention. Amid much debate about the causes of the Great Moderation, for example, Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2008) , argue that the underlying cause of the Great Moderation was more than good luck (due to favorable shocks). Rather, it was due to a change in the way the shocks were propagated, through the establishment of a better, more credible monetary policy framework. As noted by King (1996) , while broad money targeting can provide credibility, in ‡ation targeting is more direct, since it focuses on the ultimate target, and thus is more transparent. Because headline in ‡ation is readily available to the public, accountability of central bank performance comes to the central of the stage in this framework.
However, since the outbreak of the global …nancial crisis in 2008, there have been wide debates that the monetary policy (the excessively low interest rate) is one of the causes which exacebates the crisis. Lacking prudent control of the amount of liquidity which particularly pervaded on the …nancial markets has made the issue whether the interest rate rule can help stablize the asset market booms become the main concern. In response to this issue, many studies examine whether interest rate rule which responds to the asset prices or credit growth can help stablize the economy. Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2010) show that the interest rate rule which has narrowly targeted the in ‡ation rate can reinforce the boom-bust cycles of the asset market, while the interest rate rule which responds to credit growth can successfully stablize the asset prices.
The implementation of conventional monetary targeting rule, however, can be in line with the assertion that the control over credit growth helps stablize the asset markets. 1 The broad money aggregate, which consists of money through the multiple deposit creation process, is the primary funds for consumption and investment. The control over the broad money, which is closely related to bank loans, is an even more straightforward measure to control credits.
While most of the countries abandoned the monetary aggregate targeting rule, switching to the interest rate rule by the end of last century, Taiwan can be an unusual case. Since 1992, the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (thereafter CBC) has been o¢ cially targeting the growth rate of broad money through base money instruments. According to the "Purpose and Function of the CBC" (CBC, 2006), the CBC generally adopts the framework of monetary targeting and chooses the monetary aggregate, M2, to be the intermediate target. The monetary experiences of Taiwan have demonstrated that monetary targets work well. The macroeconomic fundamentals have remained relatively stable. It appears that the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has thus bucked the trend of in ‡ation targeting or exchange-rate managing among national monetary authorities in East Asia. 2 3 A comparison between Taiwan and Korea (which has implemented in ‡ation targeting rule since 1998), in Table  1 , shows that the standard deviations of the GDP growth rate, CPI in ‡ation and 1 Scharnagl, Gerberding and Seitz (2010) argued that including broad money growth rates in a Taylor rule outperforms pure in ‡ation targeting in a Taylor rule, for the Euro area. These authors make use of an estimated closed economy New Keynesian framework. They base their argument on the reality of measurement error of real-time output used by central bank policy-makers, and thus output-gap uncertainty, in the pure Taylor-rule framework. 2 Elsewhere in the region, among the "Gang of Four", of South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, there are di¤erent monetary regimes in place. The Central Bank of the Republic of Korea has adopted in ‡ation targeting with ‡exible exchange rates and interest rate instruments after the East Asian crisis. By contrast, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has followed an exchange-rate targeting framework, while the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has maintained its currency board since 1984. 3 While the o¢ cial position of the CBC is that its policy comes from a monetary-targeting framework, Hsu (1999) argued that the interest rate has been an important ancillary instrument, while Chen and Wu (2010) found some evidence of switching between interest and monetary-growth rate rules, but they argue that monetary aggregate rules can well characterize the monetary policy of the CBC before 1998. More recently, however, Teo (2009) used Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model to test the hypothesis of a monetary-targeting regime against alternative regimes based on the Taylor rule or exchange-rate targeting. Based on posterior odds ratios, the evidence strongly favored the monetary targeting regime for Taiwan. While Teo's work empirically establishes the use of the monetary targeting regime as the de facto policy framework of Taiwan, he did not perform any comparison of the macroeconomic performance of the de facto regime with counterfactual in ‡ation or exchange-rate targeting regimes, which is the aim of this paper.
share price in ‡ation rates are lower in Taiwan than in Korea based during the 1998-2007 period. Based on the experience of these two fast growing economies within the East Asia region, there is no empirical evidence that monetary targeting regimes fare worse than in ‡ation-targeting regimes. While the …nancial liberalization in the US and European countries may have led to di¢ culties in the measure of monetary aggregates and thereby the implementatin of monetary targeting, Taiwan can be a successful illustration of monetary targeting. We investigate the question of monetary aggregate targeting and …nancial stability in a calibrated DSGE small open-economy framework, with a …nan-cial sector as well as a traded and non-traded sector. We take as a proxy for …nancial-sector stability the volatility of Tobin's Q. Since Tobin's Q is the proxy for …nancial stability, our model includes investment and capital accumulation, in contrast to the model in Scharnagl, Gerberding, and Seitz (2010). We compare four regimes: a monetary-targeting regime, with liquidity injection consistent with the targeted growth rate of reserve money. The counterfactual experiments focus on the CPI in ‡ation targeting (as in Korea) , as well as a …xed exchange rate system (used in Hong Kong), and exchange-rate management (as in Singapore).
One of the key results we show in this paper is that a monetary targeting framework delivers much lower volatility in consumption and Tobin's Q, an indicator or shadow price of assets. The focus on in ‡ation targeting, which is more transparent and provides accountability, is also more limited than broad money targeting in providing stability to the share prices in the economy and …nancial markets in general. The economy can be stabilized through the conrtol of the growth rate of broad money which is the primary source of liquidity in the economy. In a small open economy as Taiwan, the …xed exchange rate or exchange rate management can help reduce the CPI in ‡ation which composes of a substantial share of import prices. 4 The next section of the paper presents the model we use for calibration and simulation. We then discuss the numerical speci…cation of parameters, and shock processes. After that, we take up comparative policy simulations, for the base case of monetary targeting and for the counterfactual cases of …xed exchange rate, a Taylor rule, and exchange-rate management. Our results show that switching from a monetary regime would not necesarily be welfare improving relative to the policy regimes of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Central Bank of Korea, or the Monetary Authority of Singapore.
The Model

Household Preferences and Endowments
We calibrate an open economy drawing on estimates used in models for Taiwan. Like many of the fast growing economies in East Asia, whose monetary regimes we compare, Taiwan is a highly open economy, widely involved in international trade in goods and capital markets. Until the end of 2011, the exports account for 70% of the GDP and the imports for 65% of the GDP, rising from ratios of 60% and 55%, respectively, in 2001. The …nancial market is well structured. In the end of 2011, 78% of the external funds are from …nancial intermediaries, and 22% from direct …nance including the stock and bond markets. Thus, small open economy DSGE model with an established …nancial sector can well characterize this economy.
Households own capital for rental and supply labor to both these export and home-goods …rms. Capital for rental to the …rms depreciates at the rate . When households accumulate or decumulate capital beyond the steady state level, they pay adjustment costs. The following law of motion is speci…ed for capital, with adjustment costs given by AC t , and is the adjustment cost parameter.
We assume that investment goods are both domestically produced and imported from abroad, and that the price P i is the relevant price for these goods.
The investment variable is a CES aggregate of these two investment goods:
The parameters i and (1 i ) are the relative shares of foreign and domestic goods in the overall investment index, while i is the price elasticity of demand for each investment component. The variable K is the steady state level of the capital stock for domestic goods producing …rms.
The demand for each investment component is a function of their relative price:
The index P f t is the price of imported goods, in domestic currency, while P x t is the price of domestic goods-producing forms (which can be exported, or used for domestic consumption and domestic investment). The overall price index for investment goods is given by the following equation:
The household consumption at time t, C t ; is a CES bundle of both domestic consumption goods, C d t and imported consumption goods, C f t :
The demand for each component of consumption is a function of the overall consumption index and the price of the respective component relative to the general price level, P :
The parameters 1 and (1 1 ) are the relative shares of foreign and domestic goods in the overall consumption index, while 1 is the price elasticity of demand for each consumption component. Domestically-produced goods are composed of both non-traded services C h t and home-produced traded goods C x t (some of which are consumed domestically). The following CES aggregator is used for domestically-produced consumption goods:
The relative demands for the home non-traded goods and the export goods are given by the following equations:
where the parameters 2 and (1 2 ) are the shares of the export and nontraded goods in domestic production of consumption goods, and 2 is the price elasticity of demand.
The domestically-produced price index is given by the following CES aggregator:
In the same manner, the overall price index, of course, is a CES function of the price of foreign and domestic consumption goods:
In addition to buying consumption goods, households put deposits M t in the bank and receive dividends from the export and non-traded or home-goods producing …rms. Total dividends is given by t , with t = x t + h t , and B t is dividend given by bank. The household pays taxes on labor income W t L t and on consumption c C t : The following equation gives the household budget constraint:
We assume that government spending G is bundled with consumption for utility in CES aggregator. We do this to indicate that there is a reason for government spending to take place, that such spending creates externalities for consumption, in the form of services which enhance household marginal utility (such as law enforcement and communication services):
However, household utility does not simply come from the current consumption bundle. Rather, habit persistence applies to this consumption index when it enters the speci…c utility function, so that the relevant consumption index is de ‡ated by the Habit Stock, H t . The Habit stock is a function of the lagged average consumption bundle, raised to the power %, the habit persistence parameter:
Overall utility is a positive function of the consumption bundle, the habit stock and a negative function of labor:
The parameter is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient, while is the disutility of labor, and $ is the Frisch labor supply elasticity. The variable Z C t is a shock to the utility of consumption and evolves according to the following process:
The household chooses the paths of consumption, labor, deposits, investment and capital, to maximize the present value of its utility function subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital. Thus, the objective function of the household is given by the following expression:
M ax fCt;Lt;Mt;It;Ktg
where the parameter represents the constant, exogenous discount factor. This optimization is subject to the budget constraint and the investment equation:
The variable R k t is the rental rate for capital to the goods-producing …rms , R m t is the return on deposits held at banks, while W t is the nominal wage rate.
The household optimization is represented by the intertemporal Lagrangian:
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Note that there are two Lagrange multipliers, one, t+ , is the marginal utility of income, while Q t+i , known as Tobin's Q, is the shadow price of capital.
Optimizing the Bellman equation with respect to the decision variables C t ; L t ; M t ; I; K t yields the following set of First-Order Conditions for the representative household:
The …rst equation, Eq. (24), simply tells us that the marginal utility of wealth is equal to the marginal utility of consumption divided by the price level. The second equation, Eq. (25), states that the marginal disutility of labor is equal to the after tax marginal utility of consumption provided by the after-tax wage. The third equation is the Keynes-Ramsey rule for optimal saving: the marginal utility of wealth today should be equal to the discounted marginal utility tomorrow, multiplied by the gross rate of return on saving (in the form of deposits).
The equation for Tobin's Q tells us that the value of capital today is the discounted marginal utility of capital tomorrow, multiplied by the return to capital, in addition to the reduced value of adjustment costs in the future (due to the higher level of capital) and the discounted value of capital tomorrow, net of depreciation.
Finally, the investment equation tells us that investment will be equal to the steady state investment, K, when 
We assume intermediate goods M I are both domestically produced and imported from abroad, and that the price P i is the relevant price for these goods. The investment variable is a CES aggregate of these two investment goods:
The parameters mi and (1 mi ) are the relative shares of foreign and domestic goods in the overall investment index, while mi is the price elasticity of demand for each investment component.
The demand for each internediate-good component is a function of its relative price:
The coe¢ cient h represents the relative factor shares of intermediate goods, while the technology shock is given by Z h t. This shock follows the autoregressive process:
The demand for the home services can be both for domestic consumption, as well for government services:
We assume that the …rm faces a liquidity constraint. It must borrow an amount N h t from banks each quarter to pay a fraction h of its wage bill, at the borrowing rate R n t :
The total pro…ts (or dividends) of the export …rm is given by the following identity:
where P mi is the price of intermediate goods.
Maximizing pro…ts with respect to the use of labor and intermediate goods, we have the following …rst-order conditions for the …rm:
Export Goods
The …rm producing export goods, as well as traded goods for domestic consumption as well as domestically-produced investment and intermediate goods, face a Cobb-Douglas technology:
There is an export demand shock Z x which follows the autoregressive process:
Foreign export demand X is also subject to a stochastic shock, t at time t.
Under a small open economy setting we also assume that the price of the export good in domestic currency is simply equal to the exchange rate S t multiplied by the world export price, P x t . We assume that the world export price follows the following exogenous stochastic process:
Total demand for the export good is composed of the local demand (for consumption purposes and investment and intermediate goods) as well as the foreign demand:
These …rms face a liquidity constraint for meeting their wage bill:
The pro…ts of the export-goods …rms are given by the following relation:
Optimizing pro…ts implies the following …rst-order condition for cost minimization:
Labor Mobility
We assume that labor can move between the home-goods and export sectors. This implies the following equality for real labor productivity in each sector:
Importing Firms
Imported goods Y f are used for both consumption C f and for investment in the goods-producing …rms, I
f as well as intermediate goods M I f :
The importing …rms do not produce these goods. However, they have to borrow a fraction f of the cost of these imported goods in order to bring them to the home market for domestic consumers and investors:
where P f t is the world price of the import goods and S t is the exchange rate. The domestic marginal cost of the imported goods is given by:
Calvo Wage and Price Setting
The labor market does not clear, and wages are modelled as staggered contracts with a fraction (1 w ) renegotiated each period. Each household j chooses the optimal wage W o t by maximizing the expected discounted utility subject to the demand for its labor L 6 This behavior is modelled in a similar manner to the Calvo sticky prices and the model is written in recursive form as:
(55)
where, W num t and W den t are auxiliary variables in the formula. We assume monopolistically competitive …rms in the non-traded services sector. Let the marginal cost at time t be given by the following expression:
6 By using Bayesian estimation on Taiwan's data, the posterior estimate of w is 0.469 in Teo (2009). Although it is lower than the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the European countries, it still shows signi…cant wage stickiness in Taiwan.
In the Calvo price setting world, there are forward-looking price setters and backward looking setters. Assuming at time t a probability of persistence of the price at , with demand for the product from …rm j given by Y
The stochastic term Z P t captures a mark-up pricing shock to the monopolistic price-setting behavior. It follows, in logarithmic form, an autoregressive process with innovations have mean zero and standard deviation
Calvo pricing for imported goods works in a similar way to Cavlo pricing for home goods. Given the marginal cost of imported goods, AF t ; the following recursive setup gives us the price setting behavior for imported goods:
The Financial Sector and Policies
The Financial Sector
Banks lend to all three types of …rms:
In addition to these …rms, the banks lend to the government B g t and receive a risk-free interest rate R t.
They borrow from foreign …nancial centers the amount B f and pay a risk premium above the domestic interest rate when such foreign debt exceeds a steady-state level B f :
The banks thus pay a gross interest rate R t + t on their outstanding dollardenominated debt B f t 1 to foreign …nancial centers. In addition to paying deposits the interest rate R m t we assume that banks are also required to set aside a required ratio of reserves on outstanding deposits, M M t . The relevant opportunity cost of holding these reserves is of course the amount the banks can earn by holding risk-free government bonds, M R t M t: In addition, banks are required to set aside a fraction of capital against their outstanding loans, N;t N t: : As in the case of the required reserves against deposits, the opportunity cost is given by N;t R t N t:
The parameter N;t is time-varying, and captures a stochastic uncertainty component in the costs of bank lending to all types of …rms. The parameter is the autoregressive parameter while N is the steady-state capital/asset ratio for banks.
The gross pro…t of the banking sector is given by the following balance-sheet identity:
The bank maximizes its present discounted value of its pro…ts, given by V B t , with respect to its portfolio of assets (loans to the government and …rms, B This set of …rst-order conditions leads to the familiar set of spreads for interest rates, as well as the interest-parity equation:
The foreign interest rate evolves according to the following law of motion:
The Monetary Policy
We assume that the liquidity provision to the banking sector, which causes the change in the reserve of the banking sector RES; adjusts to the target for the rate of growth of deposits in the banking sector. 7
where is the target rate of deposit growth, RES is the smoothing parameter and M is the reaction coe¢ cient, with M > 1: There is also a shock to monetary policy, M;t , normally distributed with variance 2 M : The interest rate adjusts in this case to equilibrate the balance sheet of the …nancial sector.
Basically this equation states that the ‡ow returns to the system from government bonds and loans to …rms, less interest payments on deposits, should be su¢ cient to …nance new loans to …rms and the government, as well as payments on foreign debt, net of new deposits and reserve injections by the central bank.. Thus, ceteris paribus, an increase in bond issues or loan demand by …rms, or foreign interest rates would increase the domestic interest rate, while an increase in deposits or reserves would decrease the interest rate.
In the counterfactual scenario of an in ‡ation targeting Taylor rule, the interest rate adjusts in the following way:
The coe¢ cients r and are the smoothing parameter and in ‡ation coef…cient, with 0 < r < 1 and > 1:R is the steady state interest rate, equal to the steady state foreign interest rate R and b t is the deviation of actual in ‡ation from the target rate of in ‡ation. Given that the central bank sets the interest rate, it provides reserves (or takes out reserves) to the banking sector through open market operations to insure a balance-sheet equilibrium:
In the counterfactual cases of the …xed exchange-rate case or exchange-rate mangement, the domestic interest rate follows the foreign interest rate plus the risk premium, while the central bank adjusts reserves to the banking sector to assure balance-sheet equiibrium For the in ‡ation-targeting exchange-rate rule, the following formula holds:
This rule shows that the monetary authority adjusts depreciation of the nominal exhange rate relative to the long-run depreciation rate s with a smoothing coe¢ cient s ; with 0 < s < 1: When in ‡ation is above its target rate, with b t > 0; the monetary authority will allow the nominal rate to appreciate. As in the Taylor rule, we assume s > 1:
Fiscal Policy
The government takes in taxes from the households and engages in spending on non-traded services. . We assume that there is smoothing in government consumption, and there is a stochastic component to spending:
Given its source of labor and consumption tax revenue, the …scal borrowing requirement is given by the following identities:
Foreign Assets
The aggregate foreign borrowing or asset accumulation evolves through the following identity:
It should be noted that the risk premium embedded in the accumulation of foreign debt e¤ected closes this open economy model, so that the domestic consumption and foreign debt levels do not become indeterminate. There are other ways to close the open economy model, such as adjustment costs on foreign debt accumulation, or an endogenous discount factor [see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)] We think that the incorporation of a time-varying endogenous risk premium is a more intuitive way to close this model.
Calibration
Calibrated Parameters a¤ecting Steady State
We calibrate the parameters in accordance with the steady state by using the Taiwan's quarterly data from the beginning of 1998 through the end of 2007, before the outbreak of the subprime crisis, for the characterization of the macroeconomic fundamentals in Taiwan.
The discount parameter follows the value used by most conventional models. The habit persistence parameter % is consistent with most of the empirical estimations. 8 1 > 2 is assumed to indicate a higher intratemporal elasticity between consumption of home and foreign goods in the total consumption index than the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of export and home goods in the domestic consumption index.
For investment, we assume an equal share of domestic and imported goods, with i = :5: The elasticity parameter i is set at 2.5, equal to the elasticity parameter for home and foreign goods.
The ratios of consumption of foreign goods in the aggregate consumption, 1 and the share of export-goods consumption in the total domestic consumption basket, 2 , are assumed to be 0.3 and 0.2 respectively, for an approximated characterization of Taiwan's consumption pattern. In this model, the steadystate values are quite sensitive to the tax rates. The income and consumption tax rates , C are assumed to be slightly higher than the applicable tax rates in Taiwan, which can be approximately 0.15 on average for the income tax and 0.05 for consumption tax respectively. The parameters are speci…ed to generate the steady-state government expenditure share in GDP to be 0.24 close to 0.2 that the data indicate. We assume a relative high smoothing component for government spending, with G set at .5.
Since the …nancial system is well established in Taiwan, thus we assume relatively low …nancial friction parameters. The parameters i , i = 1; ::3;which representing the borrowing needs of the export, home-goods and importing …rms, were all set equal at a value of .5. The capital coe¢ cient in the export production function, x , is set to to replicate the shares of capital and labor in the economy. Finally the banking reserve and lending cost parameters M ; N , are set to replicate observed low spreads in the …nancial sector. Table 2 shows the calibrated values for the volatilities and the dynamic adjustment parameters for the shock processes and the Calvo pricing. Since this is a a simulation, we specify the shocks volatilities at .01 for separate simulations. We make use of Bayesian estimation resutls by Teo for most of the parameters governing the dynamics of the shocks and the Calvo pricing. 
Calibrated Parameters for Dynamics and Volatilites
Simulation Results
We are interested in the response of consumption, in ‡ation, the exchange rate, the interest rate, Tobin's Q, as well as liquidity and deposit volatility (representing narrow and broad money aggregates) to the underlying shocks, for four altneraive monetary regimes. We compore the base regime, with broad money base targeting, with the …xed exchange rate regime, the Taylor-rule regime and the exchange rate management regime. Then we examine the volatility results for recurring shocks to the stochastic variables, based on 1000 realizations of simulations with sample size 500. We calculate the median as well as the lower and upper values of the volatilities based on a 95% con…dence level. We …rst take up domestic demand shocks to consumption and government spending, then productivity shocks to traded and non-traded goods production, followed by . After that, we examine the nominal domestic shocks to the loan cost provision and mark-up pricing, followed by foreign shocks to export demand, terms of trade and the LIBOR interest rate. Table 4 and 5 contain the volatility results of consumption, the asset prices and returns and the monetary aggregates for the shocks to consumption demand and government spending. We see, overall, that the money-targeting delivers lower volatility to consumption while the …xed rate system delivers lower in ‡ation volatility under the consumption demand shocks. As expected, the money targeting rule delives lower broad-money volatility for the consumption demand shocks. For government spending shocks, we see that the …xed-rate delivers lower consumption volatility and in ‡ation volatility. However, for Tobin's q, we see that the broad money targeting outperforms all of the other regimes for recurring consumpton demand shocks and does as well as the …xed exchange rate regime for the government spending shocks. The results indicate that for the recurring consumption demand shocks, the money-targeting regime dominates, while for the recurring government spending shocks (which are for demand for non-traded goods and services), the …xed-rate system dominates. Table 6 and 7 contain the volatility results for productivity shocks. Again we see that the volatility to Tobin's q is lowest under the monetary targeting regime, followed by the …xed exchange-rate system. For in ‡ation, the …xed rate system delivers the lower volatilities while for consumption, the monetary-targeting regime does best. Not surprisingly, the exchange rate volatility is lowest, after the …xed system, for the exchange-rate rule, while the interest-rate volatility is slightly higher under the Taylor rule than under the monetary-targeting rule. Table 8 and 9 contain the volatility results for nominal shocks, for non-traded goods mark-up pricing and for bank lending costs. Again we see that the volatility to Tobin's q is lowest under the monetary targeting regime, followed by the …xed exchange-rate system and then the exchange-rate rule. For consumption, the monetary-targeting regime outperforms the …xed rate system. Table 10 and 11 contain the volatility under terms of trade and export demand shocks. Again we see that the volatility to Tobin's q is lowest under the monetary targeting regime, followed by the …xed exchange-rate system for terms of trade shocks, but followed by the Taylor rule for the export-demand shocks. For consumption volatility, the monetary rule performs best for the terms of trade shocks, but the Taylor rule works best for the export demand shocks. For in ‡ation, the …xed exchange rate system works best for both sets of shocks. . Table 12 contains the volatility results due to foreign interest-rate shocks. , Again we see that the volatility to Tobin's q is lowest under the monetary targeting regime, followed by the …xed exchange-rate system . For consumption volatility, the monetary rule performs best, while for in ‡ation, the …xed-rate rule works best. In sum, for most of the shocks, monetary targeting rule can successfully stablize the consumption and Tobin's q, while the …xed rate rule can lead to lowest in ‡ation volatility. The result is quite intuitive. By controlling the liquidity for consumption and investment, the consumption and the capital price can be well stablized. While the over expansionary liquidity on the capital market has been considered as the primary factor accounting for the recent …nancial crisis. Our result demonstrates how the control over the liquidity circulating in the economy can help stablize the key macroeconomic variables with no signi…cant welfare loss. On the other hand, since the import of foreign goods takes up a signi…cant share in the overall consumption, the …xed exchange rate helps lower in ‡ation volatility by reducing exchange rate ‡uctuations. 
Domestic Demand Shocks
Productivity Shocks
Nominal Shocks
Terms of Trade and Foreign Demand Shocks
Foreign Inerest Rate Shocks
Conclusion
Our counterfactual simulation experiments, based on calibrated parameters for Taiwan, but representing a model for a small highly-open economy, suggest that there would be little to gain or lose, by abandoning monetary targets in favor of a Taylor type in ‡ation targeting regime. Our result may suggest that the central bank should reinforce its regulation on exchange rate volatility. The only exception would be if foreign export-demand shocks dominated. Then the Taylor rule delivers lowest consumption volatility (though not as low in ‡ation volatility as in a …xed rate system), with Q-volatility only slightly higher than in the case of monetary targets. But across all shocks, for delivering lowest Q-volatility, monetary targeting domintes the alternative policy regimes, with the exception of government spending shocks, when a …xed-rate regimes does as well. Our Taylor rule was a simple Taylor rule for in ‡ation targeting alone. We did not take into account a hybrid Taylor rule could be amended to include Q-targeting. Clearly a Taylor-type in ‡ation targeting program can be modi…ed to include expanded sets of price indices. But if the standard argument for the Taylor rule is its transparency and simplicity, then such a modi…cation would make this rule less attractive. The key result of this paper is that a simple monetary targeting framework does as well as a simple transparent Taylor rule for reducing the consumption and share price volatility. For in ‡ation, in this highly open economy, not suprisingly, a …xed rate system works best across a variety of shocks. But for overall …nancial stability, proxied by the volatility of Tobin's Q, the results strong suggest the monetary aggregate targets should play a major role.
